Paper or Plastic: Speech in an Unlikely Place by Zelante, Thomas A., Jr.
ZELANTE(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018 4:12 PM 
 
931 
PAPER OR PLASTIC: SPEECH IN AN UNLIKELY PLACE 
Thomas A. Zelante Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a consumer elects to purchase a good or service with a credit 
card, some merchants impose a surcharge to cover processing fees charged 
by credit card providers.1  In response to this practice, ten states and Puerto 
Rico, have enacted statutes prohibiting merchants from imposing surcharges 
on credit purchases.2  Generally, these anti-surcharge statutes exclusively 
prohibit merchants from charging and advertising a surcharge for credit 
purchases, but do not prohibit merchants from providing discounts for cash 
purchases.3 
Merchants in California, Florida, New York, and Texas have 
challenged their respective state’s anti-surcharge statues on the grounds that 
they violate the merchants’ First Amendment rights as unconstitutional 
regulations on protected commercial speech.4  In determining whether the 
anti-surcharge regulations abridge commercial speech rights, the threshold 
issue becomes whether these state statutes regulate economic conduct or 
commercial speech.5  The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeals are split in determining whether anti-surcharge statutes limit 
commercial speech6 and in March 2017, in Expressions Hair Design v. 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Loyola University of 
Maryland. 
 1  Merriam Webster defines a surcharge as “an additional tax, cost, or impost.” 
Surcharge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
 2  These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Texas. Credit or Debit Card Surcharge State 
Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.ncs
l.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/credit-or-debit-card-surcharges-statutes.asp
x.  See Samuel J. Merchant, Merchant Restraints: Credit-Card-Transaction Surcharging and 
Interchange-Fee Regulation in the Wake of Landmark Industry Changes, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 
327 (2016) (providing a detailed explanation of the intricacies of credit card transactions). 
 3  Credit or Debit Card Surcharge State Statutes, supra note 2.  
 4  See Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016); Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney 
Gen., 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 
118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 
1144 (2017); Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015).  
 5  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150 (2017) (Expressions 
II). 
 6  See Rowell, 816 F.3d at 80 (“Texas’ law regulates conduct, not speech”); Expressions, 
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Schneiderman, the Supreme Court determined that New York’s anti-
surcharge law constituted a speech regulation in regard to at least one 
particular pricing scheme: single-sticker pricing.7  The Court subsequently 
declined to address whether the no-surcharge law regulated speech in other 
pricing schemes and additionally did not analyze the constitutionality of the 
state law.8  As a result, the Court remanded these unaddressed issues to the 
Second Circuit, which subsequently requested that the New York Court of 
Appeals provide clarification on the meaning of New York’s anti-surcharge 
law.9  The ultimate speech or conduct classification, and the accompanying 
constitutional evaluation, will likely have a far-reaching, determinative 
effect on whether state anti-surcharge laws can survive nationwide. 
Commercial speech restrictions have traditionally been subject to 
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission.10  There, the Supreme Court established a four-
prong test to determine whether a commercial speech restriction went so far 
as to unjustifiably impede the free flow of truthful commercial information.  
In the wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.11 and Reed v. Town of Gilbert,12 
however, speculation looms as to whether the Supreme Court has signaled 
for the end of intermediate scrutiny in its commercial speech doctrine, and 
instead is prepared to subject all content-based speech restrictions to strict 
scrutiny.13 
This Comment analyzes the current circuit split between the Second, 
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s 
recent opinion in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman and argues that 
state anti-surcharge statutes unconstitutionally restrict commercial speech.  
There exist several different surcharging techniques and this Comment 
addresses two common forms: (1) single sticker-pricing––listing a single 
 
808 F.3d at 131 (same). But see Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1249 (“[T]he no surcharge 
law regulates speech and not conduct . . . .”). 
 7  Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. at 1151.   
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
 11  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 12  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 13  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority’s decision 
“suggest[s] a standard yet stricter than Central Hudson”); Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. 
Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Sorrell modified the Central Hudson test for 
laws burdening commercial speech.  Under Sorrell, courts must first determine whether a 
challenged law burdening non-misleading commercial speech about legal goods or services 
is content or speaker based.  If so, heightened judicial scrutiny is required.”), reh’g en banc 
granted sub nom, Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Gorsuch, 842 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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price and charging a surcharge for credit payment;14 and (2) dual-pricing––
listing one price for cash payment and another for credit payment.15  Laws 
targeting each surcharging system implicate speech restrictions in a different 
manner, but the result is the same—they do not pass constitutional muster.  
Moreover, this Comment argues that courts must continue to analyze 
commercial speech restrictions under Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny standard in order to strike the careful balance between protecting 
the free flow of truthful commercial information without extending core First 
Amendment protection so far as to render economic regulation impossible.  
The extension of strict scrutiny review into the commercial speech realm 
would increase the likelihood that anti-surcharge statutes would fail 
constitutional muster; however, it would also likely be detrimental to 
reasonable economic regulation. 
Part II will introduce the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine 
and discuss the means by which the Court classifies speech as distinctly 
“commercial,” as well as the level of constitutional scrutiny to which speech 
restrictions are subjected.  Part III will discuss the reason for state anti-
surcharge laws: the expired federal ban.  Part IV will introduce Florida’s, 
New York’s, Texas’s, and California’s anti-surcharge laws—the four most 
prevalent state laws to the anti-surcharge discussion—and Part V will 
explore the circuit split arising out the interpretation of these laws.  Part VI 
will explain precisely why both single-sticker and dual-pricing schemes 
amount to commercial speech restrictions.  Lastly, Part VII will demonstrate 
that anti-surcharges statutes fail intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson 
and constitute an abridgement of merchants’ First Amendment speech rights.  
Part VIII briefly concludes. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH PROTECTION AND THE SUPREME 
COURT’S EVOLVING COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The First Amendment affords commercial speech less protection from 
government regulation than other forms of constitutionally protected 
expression, and the availability of commercial speech protection turns 
largely on a balance of the nature of the commercial expression and the 
nature of the government interest in suppressing or regulating that 
expression.16  Accordingly, the government has greater authority to regulate 
 
 14  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 877 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(Expressions III). 
 15  Id. at 101. 
 16  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
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commercial speech where the speech does not “accurately inform the public 
about lawful activity,”17 where the speech intends to deceive or is likely to 
deceive or mislead the public, and where the speech is related to illegal 
activity.18  Additionally, the First Amendment does not prevent regulations 
directed at commerce or conduct that impose incidental burdens on speech;19 
however, speech protection is not wholly precluded simply because an 
individual’s interest in expression is purely economic.20 
These regulatory accommodations acknowledge the reality that 
commercial speech typically arises in areas historically subjected to 
government regulation.21  Generally, states are free to establish economic 
policies promoting public welfare and to create laws enforcing such 
policies.22  The power to regulate commercial activity additionally 
necessitates the ability to regulate commercial speech that is “linked 
inextricably” to that activity.23  Outside of these exceptions, the 
government’s ability to regulate commercial speech is more limited.24  The 
Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine provides protection for the 
free flow of economic ideas as a means to aid the public in making decisions 
in the marketplace.25  States’ regulatory authority, in this regard, is 
diminished when a commercial speech restriction “strike[s] at the substance 
of the information communicated rather than the commercial aspect” of the 
communication.26  This regulatory capability is further reduced when a state 
institutes a complete ban on the communication of truthful commercial 
information.27  There, courts are less likely to defer to states’ economic 
regulatory authority and more likely to provide rigorous First Amendment 
review of the state action.28  As a result of the public’s substantial interest in 
the unimpeded flow of truthful commercial information, regulations on non-
 
 17  Id. 
 18  See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–16 (1979); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464–65 (1978); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on 
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). 
 19  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). 
 20  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–
73 (1976) (holding that states may not prohibit the dissemination of truthful information 
regarding lawful activity because of fear that such information may have a negative effect 
upon disseminates and its recipients).  
 21  Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. 
 22  Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). 
 23  Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10, n.9. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
 26  44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (citing Linmark 
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)). 
 27  Id. at 501.  
 28  Id. 
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misleading commercial speech must be a “last-not first-resort.”29 
B. Commercial Speech Defined 
The commercial speech doctrine broadly represents an 
“accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression about goods 
and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods 
and services.”30  In order to determine the applicability of commercial speech 
protection to particular expression, commercial speech must first be 
identified.  This classification, however, has proven to be largely imprecise.31  
In fact, neither the Second, Fifth, nor Eleventh Circuits, in their respective 
analyses of anti-surcharge regulations, explicitly identified the proper 
analytical framework for classifying commercial speech. 
Commercial speech and its relation to First Amendment protection first 
arose in 1942 in Valentine v. Chrestensen,32 and for more than thirty years, 
the Court defined commercial speech as that which “propose[d] a 
commercial transaction.”33  In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court required that, 
to qualify as commercial speech, commercial proposals must communicate 
factual information of public interest.34  The following year, in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court 
provided that speech which does “no more than propose a commercial 
transaction” may qualify for commercial speech protection.35  In Central 
Hudson, the Court redefined commercial speech as “expression related 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”36  In order 
to distinguish commercial speech from simple prices, the Court has looked 
to whether the speech exists in an advertising format, whether there exists a 
reference to a specific product, and whether there is an underlying economic 
motive.37 
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of 
Ohio, the Court returned to the “propose a commercial transaction” standard 
and noted that “advertising pure and simple” sufficiently qualifies as 
 
 29  Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002). 
 30  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–15, 903 (2d ed. 1988). 
 31  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 787 
(1976) (“There are undoubted difficulties with an effort to draw a bright line between 
‘commercial speech’ on the one hand and ‘protected speech’ on the other hand, and the Court 
does better to face up to these difficulties than to attempt to hide them under labels.”).  
 32  316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 33  Id. at 54; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 384 (1973). 
 34  421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975). 
 35  425 U.S. at 762. 
 36  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980). 
 37  Bolder v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76 (1983). 
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commercial speech.38  The commercial transaction standard was twice 
affirmed in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox39 
and City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,40 where both times the 
Court noted the “commonsense basis” for distinguishing between “speech 
proposing a commercial transaction” and other varieties of speech.41  Though 
the Court has altered its classification several times, commercial speech is 
currently identified as that which proposes a commercial transaction.42 
C. The Commercial Speech Standard of Scrutiny 
Determining which speech qualifies as commercial and what degree of 
protection commercial speech is afforded has proven to be a difficult task.  
After several years of utilizing different degrees of scrutiny to evaluate the 
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech, the Supreme Court 
established a four-prong test in Central Hudson.43  The test asks whether: (1) 
the challenged law regulates speech that is misleading or related to unlawful 
activity; (2) the government has a substantial interest at stake in the 
challenged regulation; (3) the challenged regulation directly advances the 
government’s interest; and (4) a more limited restriction would be 
insufficient to achieve the government’s interest.44  The Central Hudson test, 
in turn, applies a degree of scrutiny more exacting than rational basis review, 
but more easily satisfied than strict scrutiny. 
Central Hudson currently controls as the constitutional framework 
through which commercial speech challenges are evaluated;45 however, the 
Court’s analysis in recent commercial speech cases has fueled speculation 
that such challenges may instead be subject to First Amendment strict 
scrutiny.46  In Sorrell, the Supreme Court addressed a law that restricted “the 
sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing 
practices of individual doctors.”47  The Sorrell Court determined that the 
law’s restriction on the free flow of truthful information amounted to a 
content-based speech restriction and the Court applied both First 
 
 38  471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). 
 39  492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). 
 40  507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993). 
 41  Id. at 422–24. 
 42  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564, 584 U.S. 552 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 43  447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
 44  Id. at 566. 
 45  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–56 (2001).  See also Sorrell, 564 
U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying Central Hudson). 
 46  See Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. 
L.J. 497 (2015) (suggesting that Sorrell indicates that commercial speech regulations are now 
subject to strict scrutiny); Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Gorsuch, 842 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 
2016).   
 47  564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
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Amendment strict scrutiny and Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.48  
Though the Court did not expressly state which standard of review was 
mandated, and held that the regulation at issue was unconstitutional under 
the traditional “commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial 
scrutiny,” the application of strict scrutiny, to any degree, is unavoidably 
significant.49  More recently, in Reed, the Court addressed a state law 
restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary outdoor signs.50  
There, a local church and its pastor sought to advertise Sunday church 
services and placed numerous signs throughout the town, noting the time and 
location of church services.51  The Court held that the state law was a content-
based speech restriction and, therefore, was subject to strict scrutiny.52 
It is unclear that either Sorrell or Reed indicates that the Court is 
pivoting away from the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard and 
toward a strict scrutiny standard for commercial speech challenges.  First, it 
is unlikely that the challenge presented in Reed, which involved speech 
advertising church services for a non-profit organization,53 sufficiently 
qualified as commercial speech.  The Reed majority failed to mention 
Central Hudson, to discuss commercial speech, or to suggest that promoting 
church services amounted to a proposition for a commercial transaction.54  
Further, although the Sorrell majority applied strict scrutiny,55 it is 
significant that the Court utilized strict scrutiny in addition to, rather than in 
lieu of, Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.  Lastly, understanding Sorrell 
to hold that content-based and speaker-based commercial speech regulations 
must be subjected to strict scrutiny would entail assuming that the majority 
sought to “threaten[] . . . widely accepted regulatory activity” in nearly all 
commercial sectors.56  Though possible, it is unlikely that the Sorrell 
majority sought to undo a significant regulatory framework through an 
implication.  Accordingly, Sorrell and Reed do not suggest that challenges 
to commercial speech restrictions will no longer be analyzed under the 





 48  Id. at 565, 572. 
 49  Id. at 571. 
 50  135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015). 
 51  Id.  
 52  Id. at 2232. 
 53  Id. at 2225. 
 54  Id. at 2226–2231. 
 55  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011). 
 56  Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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III. THE EXPIRED FEDERAL BAN: THE REASON FOR STATE ANTI-
SURCHARGE LAWS 
Prior to 1974, credit card issuers—such as American Express, Visa, and 
MasterCard—contracted with merchants to prohibit them from charging 
consumers different prices based on payment method.57  Merchants agreed 
to incur the fee charged by card issuers each time a consumer paid with a 
credit card—the swipe fee.58  In 1974, however, Congress amended the 
Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)59 and provided merchants the ability 
to offer cash discounts to circumvent the anti-surcharge provisions in their 
contracts.60  In 1975, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated a regulation 
exempting credit surcharges from TILA’s disclosure requirements, thus 
creating a distinction between cash discounts and credit card surcharges.61  
Congress then amended TILA again to ratify the Federal Reserve Board’s 
promulgation and banned credit card surcharges entirely.62  The amendment 
highlighted the distinction between protected cash discounts and the newly 
unlawful surcharges.63  Further, the federal law defined a surcharge as any 
means of an increase to the regular price to a cardholder, which is not 
imposed on cash customers.64  Discount was defined as a reduction from the 





 57  See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).  
Specifically, these agreements provided that merchants would not charge customers higher 
prices for credit card payments because the card issuers feared that a higher fee would 
disincentivize consumers from using credit cards.  Id.   
 58  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 76 (5th Cir. 2016).  Swipe fees generally constitute 
two to three percent of the transaction cost.  Expressions, 808 F.3d at 122. 
 59  Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, § 306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1515 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a) (2012)).   
 60  Id.  Section 1666(a) provides that issuers of credit cards “may not . . . prohibit any 
such seller from offering a discount to a cardholder to induce the cardholder to pay by cash, 
check, or similar means rather than use a credit card.”  Id.  
 61  See Fair Credit Billing, Description of Transactions, 40 Fed. Reg. 43,200, 43,203 
(Sept. 19, 1975) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).  
 62  See Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197 (1976).  The 1976 
amendment provided that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a 
cardholder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”  
Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id.  
 65  Id.  
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The federal surcharge ban was originally set to expire in 1979; 
however, Congress extended the ban until 1981.66  After extending the ban 
again from 1981 to 1984, Congress attempted to ameliorate growing 
criticism of the law’s vague surcharge/discount distinction by clarifying the 
term “regular price.”67  Regular price was defined as: 
 
the tag or posted price charged for the property or service if a 
single price is tagged or posted, or the price charged for the 
property or service when payment is made by use of a credit card 
if either (1) no price is tagged or posted, or (2) two prices are 
tagged or posted, one of which is charged when payment is made 
by use of a credit card and the other when payment is made by use 
of cash, check, or other similar means.68 
 
In 1984, the federal ban on credit card surcharges expired and, as a 
result, credit card issuers began re-adding anti-surcharge provisions into 
their merchant contracts and states began implementing statewide anti-
surcharge statutes.69  The contractual anti-surcharge provisions subsequently 
became the subject of antitrust class action suits against credit card issuers.70  
In 2013, these suits resulted in a nationwide settlement agreement, 
mandating Visa, MasterCard, and American Express to remove the anti-
surcharge provisions from their merchant contracts.71  With the federal anti-
surcharge ban having expired and the contractual anti-surcharge provisions 
having been removed, state anti-surcharge laws are the only obstacle 
preventing merchants from imposing a surcharge on credit transactions.72 
 
 
 66  See Financial Institutions Regulatory & Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-630, tit. XV, § 1501, 92 Stat. 3641, 3713 (1978). 
 67  Cash Discount Act § 102, Pub.L. No. 97-25, 95 Stat. 144 (1981) (codified in relevant 
part at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(y)). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id.; see also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 
F. Supp. 2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  In In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, a class of 
approximately twelve million merchants filed an antitrust action against Visa U.S.A., Inc. and 
MasterCard International Incorporated, as well as several other banks, alleging that Visa, 
MasterCard, and the corresponding banks “conspired to fix interchange fees in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 213.  The District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York approved a proposed settlement that called for: (1) “a cash recovery slightly in excess 
of $7 billion” by members of the class; (2) and “certain reforms of the defendants’ rules and 
practices” to benefit members of the class.  Id.  Specifically, the settlement provided for “Visa 
and MasterCard rule modifications to permit merchants to surcharge on Visa- or MasterCard-
branded credit card transactions at both the band and products level.” Id. at 217. 
 72  Rowell, 816 F.3d at 77; In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 217. 
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IV. THE STATE LEGISLATION—FLORIDA’S, NEW YORK’S, TEXAS’S, AND 
CALIFORNIA’S ANTI-SURCHARGE LAWS 
The Florida legislature enacted an anti-surcharge law in 2010, which 
provides that “[a] seller or lessor in a sales or lease transaction may not 
impose a surcharge on the buyer or lessee for electing to use a credit card in 
lieu of payment by cash.”73  Section 501.0117 defines a surcharge as “[a]ny 
additional amount imposed at the time of a sale or lease transaction by the 
seller or lessor that increases the charge to the buyer or lessee for the 
privilege of using a credit card to make [the] payment.”74  Florida’s ban, 
much like expired federal anti-surcharge law, creates an exception for cash 
discounts.75 
In reaction to the expiration of the federal ban, New York enacted an 
anti-surcharge law in1984.76  Section 518 of the New York General Business 
Law provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a 
surcharge on a [credit card] holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of 
payment by cash.”77  Unlike Florida’s ban, the New York statute does not 
define the term surcharge, does not list exceptions, and does not mention or 
distinguish cash discounts.78  The bill summary suggests that the law was 
enacted to protect against the risk of sudden price fluctuations that may arise 
after observing the customer’s payment choice and to prevent the surprise of 
a higher price at the register.79  The law addresses the potential risk that 
“merchants would at the time of the sale, raise or lower the price according 
to the method of payment, leaving the consumer . . . subject to dubious 
marketing practices and variable purchase prices.”80  Additionally, the bill 
summary provides that “merchant[s] would be able to offer a discount for 
cash if they so desire.”81 
Section 604A.0021 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code 
Annotated, previously section 339.001 of the Texas Finance Code, was 
enacted in 1985 and provides that “[i]n a sale of goods or services, a seller 
may not impose a surcharge on a buyer who uses a credit card for an 
extension or credit instead of cash.”82  Similar to New York’s ban, the Texas 
 
 73  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.0117 (LexisNexis 2017). 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. (allowing the “offering of a discount for the purpose of inducing payment by 
cash”). 
 76  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).  
 77  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. through 2017 released chapters 1–502). 
 78  See id. 
 79  See Expressions, 808 F.3d at 124–25. 
 80  Id. (citation omitted). 
 81  Id. at 125 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 82   TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017). 
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statute does not make an express distinction between cash discounts and 
credit surcharges.83  Though the statute does not define the term “surcharge,” 
the Fifth Circuit interpreted the term to be consistent with the definition in 
the expired federal law: “an additional amount above the seller’s regular 
price.”84  The statute does not define regular price.85 
Lastly, section 1748.1(a) of the California Civil Code provides that 
“[n]o retailer . . . may impose a surcharge on a cardholder who elects to use 
a credit card in lieu of payment by cash.”86  The California statute, unlike 
New York’s and Texas’, expressly states that a retailer may offer discounts 
to induce cash payment.87  The statement of intent indicates that the law’s 
goal is to: 
 
promote the effective operation of the free market and protect 
consumers from deceptive price increases for goods and services 
by prohibiting credit card surcharges and encouraging the 
availability of discounts by those retailers who wish to offer a 
lower price for goods and services purchased by some form of 
payment other than credit card.88 
 
The ten existing anti-surcharge statutes, including the four mentioned 
above, serve as complete bans on any credit surcharge.89  Conversely, 
merchants in states without anti-surcharge regulations may implement a 
surcharge larger than any swipe fee.90  Minnesota, however, enacted a unique 
and more precise surcharge restriction designed to curtail unwarned and 
unrestrained surcharges.91  In Minnesota, a merchant may impose a 
surcharge for credit purchases, “provided: (1) the seller informs the 
purchaser of the surcharge both orally at the time of the sale and by a sign 
conspicuously posted on the seller’s premises, and (2) the surcharge does not 
exceed five percent of the purchase price.”92 
No state has provided justification for the disparate treatment of credit 
surcharges and cash discounts; however, it is probable that the distinction 
resulted from credit card industry lobbying efforts.93  The majority of state 
 
 83  Id. 
 84  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80–82 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 85  See § 604A.0021. 
 86  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(a) (Deering 2017). 
 87  Id. 
 88  § 1748.1(e) . 
 89  Credit or Debit Card Surcharge State Statutes, supra note 2. 
 90  Id. 
 91  MINN. STAT. § 325G.051 (LEXISNEXIS 2017). 
 92  Id. 
 93  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
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anti-surcharge statutes were passed within a five-year window of the lapsed 
federal ban, and states with prior existing surcharge restrictions implemented 
exceptions for cash discounts in that same window.94  Though states with 
surcharge bans amount to only 20% of those in the United States, together 
they contain approximately 40% of the United States’ population.95  It is no 
coincidence that California, Texas, New York, and Florida—the four most 
populous states in the country—have been the major focus of these 
regulations.96  Accordingly, the purpose of anti-surcharge statutes may be 
less related to consumer protection than the states originally suggested. 
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals were split 
as to whether no-surcharge restrictions regulated commercial speech or 
economic conduct, but in March 2017, the Supreme Court provided some 
clarity, at least in the single-sticker context.97  The challengers in Expressions 
Hair Design demonstrate the different potential avenues to achieve the 
uniform desires of merchant-challengers nationwide: to inform customers 
about swipe fees and to charge an extra fee for using credit cards.98  
Expressions Hair Design, specifically, sought to advertise the posted price 
for its service, plus a 3% surcharge for credit payment to offset the cost of 
swipe fees.99  Other sellers sought to charge two different prices for cash and 
credit purchasers, but specifically want to label the difference between cash 
and credit prices as a surcharge because they believe it is more effective in 
communicating their message than labeling the difference as a discount.100  
Together, merchants maintain that their commercial speech rights are 
 
(“In 1984, however, Congress allowed the no-surcharge provision to lapse.  In response, the 
credit card industry began lobbying for state-level no-surcharge laws, which were eventually 
enacted in ten states, including New York.” (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518)), judgment 
entered, No. 13-CV-3775, 2013 WL 7203883 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2013), vacated, 803 F.3d 94 
(2d Cir. 2015), and vacated, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), 
and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017); Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social 
Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 9 n.35 (2008) (“Based on 
barebones legislative history for eleven of the twelve states with no-surcharge rules, most 
state no-surcharge rules appear to be the result of credit card industry lobbying in the 1980s.”). 
 94  Expressions, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 349; Levitin, supra note 93. 
 95  Merchant, supra note 2, at 354 (citing United States Census 2010, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census. gov/2010census/). 
 96  Id. 
 97  Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (holding that restrictions on single-sticker 
pricing regulate how merchants communicate their prices and, as a result, implicate 
commercial speech protection). 
 98  Brief for Petitioners at 12, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 30 
(2016) (No. 15-1391). 
 99  Id. at 20. 
 100  Id.  
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unconstitutionally infringed because no-surcharge laws limit a method of 
advertising prices to consumers, as there is no real distinction between a 
discount and a surcharge.101 
A. Anti-Surcharge Laws as a Regulation on Commercial Speech 
In Dana’s Railroad Supply v. Bondi, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed 
Florida’s anti-surcharge law and concluded that it regulated commercial 
speech.102  In order to ascertain precisely what the law regulated, the court 
began by identifying that which it did not regulate.103  It determined that the 
law expressly permitted dual pricing, so long as the second form was listed 
as a cash discount, rather than a credit surcharge.104  Additionally, it held the 
statute did not constitute a prohibition on bait-and-switch schemes because 
such a construction would “narrow the no-surcharge law into nothingness” 
and render it too easily avoidable.105  Further, the court reasoned that there 
exists no distinction between a surcharge and a discount because a surcharge 
is merely a negative discount.106 
Having determined that surcharges and discounts are indistinguishable, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a violation of the statute turned 
exclusively on a merchant’s mode of communication to consumers, rather 
than a merchant’s conduct.107  Accordingly, the law solely prohibited how a 
merchant explains his pricing scheme by targeting expression alone, such 
that it should be renamed a “surcharges-are-fine-just-don’t-call-them-that-
law.”108 
The court offered two examples to illustrate that the statute regulates 
speech rather than conduct and that any distinction in the final result is 
merely one of perception rather than one of substantive difference.  First, 
“[i]f the same copy of Plato’s Republic can be had for $30 in cash or $32 by 
credit card, absent any communication from the seller, does the consumer 
incur a $2 surcharge or does he receive a $2 discount?”109  Secondly, the 
 
 101  Id. at 26. 
 102  Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 103  Id. at 1243. 
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 1244. 
 106  Id. at 1245. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245. 
 109  Id.  This example illustrates that in a dual-pricing scheme, absent some communication 
from the seller and absent a “regular price” definition, the customer cannot determine whether 
he is faced with a discount or a surcharge.  If a statute adopted the lapsed federal ban’s “regular 
price” definition, however, the credit price would serve as the regular price.  Assuming the 
federal definition’s application, the consumer would not be incurring a surcharge so long as 
the credit price was higher than the cash price.  Here, Florida had neither defined regular price 
nor adopted the federal definition, thus the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning was sound.  Id. 
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court compared the anti-surcharge law to a hypothetical state law prohibiting 
restaurants from providing patrons with half-empty drinks, while enabling 
them to provide half-full drinks.110  The court reasoned that a half-empty/
half-full classification would constitute a content-based speech restriction 
because it merely regulates how a message could be conveyed, despite 
permitting an objectively indistinguishable final product.111  As a result, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the anti-surcharge regulation amounted to a 
content-based speech restriction that governed “how to express relative 
values” and “impos[es] criminal liability for making the ‘wrong choice’ 
between equally plausible alternative descriptions of an objective reality,” 
which fails under any form of heightened scrutiny.112 
This rationale was reiterated in Italian Colors Restaurant v. Harris.113  
There, the District Court for the Eastern District of California addressed 
California’s anti-surcharge law and concluded that the law constituted a 
speech restriction because it mandated the manner in which merchants 
assigned prices,114 and because it regulated “speech that conveys price 
information.”115  Regulating how prices or a pricing scheme is 
communicated to consumers, the court reasoned, is distinguishable from an 
economic regulation that controls “what is charged or paid for something.”116  
Moreover, the law constituted a content-based speech restriction because the 
content of retailers’ speech was “scrutinized to determine if the price is 
framed as a permissible discount or an impermissible surcharge.”117 
The Italian Colors Court then applied intermediate scrutiny under 
Central Hudson and found both that surcharges did not present a “real” harm 
and that the restriction was “much broader than necessary” to prevent unfair 
surprises at the register.118  The Eastern District concluded that any potential 
harm posed by credit surcharges was undermined by the fact that the law 
enabled California’s state agencies to utilize credit-surcharging schemes.119  
Additionally, the court found that mandating the disclosure of surcharges 
before the register was the “most direct way to prevent consumer 
 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id.  
 112  Id. at 1246.  
 113  Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 114  Id. at 1207. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011)) (“An individual’s 
right to speak is implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints 
on the way in which the information might be used’ or disseminated.”). 
 117  Id. at 1208. 
 118  Id. at 1209–10. 
 119  Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1209.  
ZELANTE(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  4:12 PM 
2018] COMMENT 945 
deception,”120 and as a result, the court held that the statute constituted an 
unconstitutional content-based speech restriction.121 
Additionally, Consumer Action and the National Association of 
Consumer Advocates (NACA) filed amicus briefs in Expressions Hair 
Design, asserting that no-surcharge restrictions regulate speech by 
controlling how a merchant may articulate a pricing scheme to a 
consumer.122  They contended that anti-surcharge laws “hinder consumers’ 
ability to make meaningful and cost conscious decisions about payment 
choice” because merchants are prohibited from educating their consumers 
about swipe fees.123  Consumer Action and NACA argue that this lack of 
consumer knowledge results in American merchants paying the highest 
swipe fees amongst merchants worldwide.124  Similarly, the United States 
Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, Inc. (PIRG) asserted that 
this educational divide affords merchants with one option: raising prices 
universally.125  In turn, amici contended that these regulations cannot serve 
any government interest because the across-the-board price raises most 
severely affect poorer consumers—who disproportionately pay with cash 
over credit—as they are paying an otherwise higher price than those paying 
with credit.126  Following this logic, prices would drop across the board if 
credit surcharges were implemented. 
B.  Anti-Surcharge Laws as a Regulation on Economic Conduct 
In Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,127 the Second Circuit 
addressed a challenge to New York’s anti-surcharge law and divided the 
challenge into two distinct claims: one pertaining to single-sticker pricing 
and one pertaining to dual-pricing.128  The court concluded that, as applied 
to single-sticker pricing, the surcharge restriction did not implicate 
commercial speech because it exclusively regulated economic conduct.129  
The Second Circuit abstained from addressing the dual-pricing argument 
 
 120  Id. at 1210. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Brief for Consumer Action & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 
15-1391).   
 123  Id. 
 124  Id.  Consumers incur approximately $50 billion in swipe fees per year.  Id.  
 125  Brief for U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp. Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 4–5, Expressions Hair Design v. Schniederman, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) 
(No. 15-1391).   
 126  Id. at 6. 
 127  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 30, (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).   
 128  Id. at 128–29. 
 129  Id. at 130. 
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because the court was uncertain that New York’s no-surcharge law, in fact, 
prohibited dual-pricing schemes.130 
The court began its analysis by noting that prices, alone, do not qualify 
as speech,131 and that price regulations, as well as other forms of direct 
economic regulation, do not implicate First Amendment protection.132  The 
Second Circuit analogized the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island—where the Court emphasized that price regulations do 
not necessitate First Amendment safeguards—to New York’s anti-surcharge 
ban.133  The Second Circuit reasoned that if price regulation is free from First 
Amendment protection, then laws governing the “relationship[] between 
prices” must be equally insulated from commercial speech protection.134  The 
Expressions Hair Design Court additionally couched its conclusion that anti-
surcharge laws do not concern commercial speech on the notion that a 
surcharge could be recognized “wholly without reference to the words that 
the seller uses to describe its pricing scheme.”135  An investigation into the 
sticker or regular price, the court concluded, provides all necessary 
information: where a seller charges a sum above the sticker price that is not 
imposed on cash payments, then that increased price constitutes an illegal 
surcharge.136  Moreover, since the “words and labels” necessary to determine 
that a pricing scheme amounts to a surcharge were “merely prices,” which 
do not receive First Amendment protection,137 the Second Circuit found that 
the anti-surcharge statute exclusively regulated economic conduct and the 
court did not conduct a Central Hudson inquiry.138 
 
 
 130  Id. at 140. 
 131  Id. at 130 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) (holding that prices do not 
qualify as speech within the meaning of the First Amendment and price-control laws have 
never been thought to implicate the First Amendment); Munn, 94 U.S. at 125 (“[I]t has been 
customary . . . in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, 
hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, and in doing so to fix a maximum charge 
to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold.”).  
 132  Id. at 130–31 (citing to 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1977)).  In 
44 Liquormart, Rhode Island prohibited liquor stores from advertising alcohol and liquor 
prices outside of the place of sale.  44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 489–90.  The Supreme 
Court concluded that this restriction implicated commercial speech rights because it restricted 
the free flow of truthful commercial information and found it unconstitutional under Central 
Hudson because it did not serve the asserted purpose of consumer protection.  Id. at 499–504.  
 133  Expressions, 808 F.3d at 130–31.  
 134  Id. at 131.   
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 130–32.  “The only ‘words and labels’ on which the operation of the statute thus 
depends are (1) the seller’s sticker price and (2) the price the seller charges to credit card 
customers.”  Id. at 131.  New York’s anti-surcharge law does not define regular price.  See 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. through 2017 released chapters 1-502). 
 137  Expressions, 808 F.3d at 130–31.  
 138  Id. at 131. 
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The Fifth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s rationale in Rowell v. 
Pettijohn,139 and held that Texas’ anti-surcharge statute does not regulate 
speech, but instead regulates conduct, as a means to ensure that “merchants 
do not impose an additional charge above the regular price for customers 
paying with credit cards.”140  Texas’ law does not contain express language 
regarding cash discounts.141  The Fifth Circuit, however, reasoned that this 
silence permits merchants to implement dual-pricing schemes, so long as 
merchants do not add a credit surcharge.142  The legislation’s original 
sponsor stated that it is in the state’s best interest to “protect the consumer” 
and prohibit additional costs above some unidentified regular price, although 
the sponsor did not indicate that from which the consumers required 
protecting.143 
The Fifth Circuit determined that the Texas anti-surcharge law 
exclusively prohibits merchants from charging credit customers an amount 
in addition to the regular price that is not charged to cash customers, while 
allowing for a cash discount.144  Determining that a surcharge differs from a 
discount, the court found that Texas’ surcharge prohibition unambiguously 
bars merchants from changing a price above the “regular price,” which 
amounts to nothing more than a regulation on the relationship between 
prices.145  The Texas statute does not define “regular price” and the Texas 
legislature did not adopt the federal definition.146  Furthermore, the court 
found that any speech implicated in the restriction is “merely incidental to 
the regulated economic conduct” and not significant enough to warrant any 
First Amendment protection.147 
Additionally, Public Citizen, Inc., Consumers Union, the National 
Consumer Law Center, and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids filed 
amicus briefs before the Supreme Court in Expressions Hair Design, 
asserting that the anti-surcharge laws regulate conduct because they prohibit 
the imposition of “an additional charge on cardholders at the register” after 
a seller provided a standard price for an item.148  The consumer advocate 
 
 139  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80–82 (5th Cir. 2016).  
 140  Id. at 80.  Texas’s anti-surcharge statute, like New York’s, does not define regular 
price.  See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017). 
 141  See § 604A.0021. 
 142  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d at 81. 
 143  Hearings on Tex. H.B. 1558 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Insts., 69th Leg. R.S. (Apr. 
22, 1985). 
 144 Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d at 81. 
 145  Id.  
 146  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017). 
 147  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d at 82. 
 148  Brief of Amici Curiae Pub. Citizen, Inc., et al. in Support of Respondents at 5, 10, 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1391), 2016 WL 
7450493.   
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groups emphasized that if the Fifth Circuit finds that the anti-surcharge 
statutes constitute speech regulation, then such a finding would threaten the 
government’s ability to continue to regulate a broad range of currently 
regulated areas, such as “food manufactur[ing], debt collect[ing], or drug 
companies.”149  Amici contended that such a broad expansion of First 
Amendment protection threatens to eradicate the government’s current 
regulatory framework and return the government’s ability to regulate 
economic activity to the diminished “laissez-faire” capacity established in 
Lochner v. New York.150  Constitutional, Administrative, Contracts, and 
Health Law scholars share the fear of a return to Lochner-style economic 
regulation, and argue that expanding First Amendment protection to such 
conduct would threaten “opt-in/opt-out regulations,” “prohibitions on 
offering discounts for harmful products,” “food and drug regulations,” and 
“everything from mandated contract language to employment discrimination 
to antitrust law.”151 
C. The Supreme Court’s Partial Determination 
In March 2017, in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the Second Circuit’s decision and addressed the 
narrow issue of whether New York’s prohibition on advertising a surcharge 
in the single-sticker context constitutes a restriction on commercial 
speech.152  Analyzing the practical effect of the law, the Court determined 
that the regulation “tells merchants nothing about the amount they are 
allowed to collect,” and instead concerns only “how sellers may 
communicate their prices.”153  “In regulating the communication of prices 
 
 149  Id. at 28.  
 150  Id. at 3, 12; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  In Lochner v. New York, the 
Supreme Court held that a state law regulating the number of hours an employee could work 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting the freedom of 
contract.  Id. at 64, abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  Locher 
came to symbolize a nearly half-century period where the Supreme Court “struck down close 
to two hundred state and federal laws regulating a wide variety of market relationships.”  Sujit 
Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 4 
(2004).  This period is commonly referred to as the “Lochner Era” and embodied “judicial 
resistance” to economic legislative regulation.  Id. at 5.  Amici fear that applying strict scrutiny 
to commercial speech restrictions will initiate a return to Lochner era economic de-regulation 
and significantly hinder the functionality of the regulatory state.  Brief of Amici Curiae 
Constitutional, Admin., Contracts, & Health Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 23–
29, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1391), 2016 WL 
7494904.   
 151  Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 150, at 23–29.   
 152  Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 153  Id. at 1151 (“A merchant who wants to charge $10 for cash and $10.30 for credit may 
not convey that price any way he pleases.  He is not free to say ‘$10, with a 3% credit card 
surcharge’ or ‘$10, plus $0.30 for credit’ because both of those displays identify a single 
sticker price—$10—that is less than the amount credit card users will be charged.”). 
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rather than the prices themselves,” the Court concluded, New York’s anti-
surcharge law regulated commercial speech in the single-sticker context.154 
The Expressions Hair Design Court left unanswered questions 
regarding the law’s effect on dual-pricing schemes and the law’s 
constitutionality more generally.  Specifically, the Court did not opine as to 
whether the no-surcharge regulation is a valid commercial speech regulation 
under Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard or, instead, whether 
the law must be analyzed as a mandatory disclosure requirement under 
rational basis review.155  As a result, the Court remanded these issues to the 
Second Circuit for further review.156  The Second Circuit subsequently 
acknowledged that it was not capable of fully addressing these outstanding 
questions without first conclusively understanding the breadth and practical 
operation of New York’s anti-surcharge law.157  As a result, the Second 
Circuit Panel certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of 
whether a merchant complies with New York’s anti-surcharge law “so long 
as the merchant posts the total-dollars-and-cents price charged to credit card 
users.”158 
Accordingly, it is now clear that anti-surcharge laws prohibiting 
merchants from advertising and charging a sum in addition to a single listed 
price regulate speech.  Whether the same laws’ prohibitions on advertising 
and charging a surcharge in the dual-pricing context, and whether such laws 
are subject to Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny, remains unclear. 
VI. ANTI-SURCHARGE REGULATIONS QUALIFY AS COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
RESTRICTIONS 
The plaintiff-merchants in Expressions Hair Design and the other anti-
surcharge cases sought the same end, albeit by somewhat different means: 
the ability to advertise surcharges.  Some wished to display a single posted 
price and advertise a surcharge to that price—single-sticker pricing—while 
others sought to display one price for cash purchases and another for credit 
purchases—dual pricing.159  Though both pricing schemes amount to 
commercial speech restrictions,160 each scheme reaches that end in a 
 
 154  Id. At 1151.   
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Expressions III, 877 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We see no obvious way to conduct 
the functional analysis this view of the Central Hudson/Zauderer distinction requires without 
first gaining greater clarity about the correct application of Section 518 under New York 
law.”). 
 158  Id. at 102. 
 159  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).   
 160  See infra Part V.A. & B. 
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relatively unique manner.  Accordingly, the two pricing schemes are best 
addressed individually to illustrate how laws targeting each scheme qualify 
as commercial speech restrictions and, as a result, must be subjected to 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard. 
A. Single-Sticker Pricing Schemes 
In the single-sticker context, anti-surcharge laws prohibit merchants 
from listing a single posted price and from implementing a credit surcharge 
in addition to that price.161  Generally, however, the laws enable merchants 
to implement a discount for cash purchases.162  Despite the means by which 
a merchant relates this information to a consumer, the final price for a credit 
card user will be the same.163  Accordingly, since the result is the same, the 
laws mandate how merchants must explain a pricing scheme to customers.164  
Though the Supreme Court made clear in Expressions Hair Design that anti-
surcharge regulations serve as a restriction on commercial speech in the 
single-sticker context, the Court did not comprehensively apply its 
commercial speech jurisprudence in reaching its conclusion.165  Accordingly, 
it is imperative to analyze no-surcharge regulations through this 
jurisprudential lens to demonstrate that such regulations: (1) do not 
constitute mandatory disclosure requirements, which are subject to rational 
basis review; and (2) constitute invalid commercial speech regulations under 
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.  This distinction is meaningful 
because mandatory disclosure requirements do not qualify as burdens on 
commercial speech and “trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s 
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech.”166  As a result, if anti-surcharge 
statutes are classified as disclosure requirements, then they will not be 
subject to Central Hudson’s test and will likely survive under rational basis 
review.167  Mandatory disclosure requirements necessitate that an advertiser 
provides the public with more information on a good or service than he 
otherwise would, absent that requirement.168  On the other hand, laws that 
prevent an advertiser from providing the public with additional information 
 
 161  Expressions III, 877 F.3d at 103. 
 162  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017); N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. through 2017 released chapters 1-502). 
 163  For example, a product listed for $102 with a $2 discount for cash payment yields a 
final credit price of $102.  Likewise, a product listed for $100 with a $2 credit surcharge yields 
a final credit price of $102.  Though the perception surrounding the price change is different, 
the final product is objectively indistinguishable.   
 164  Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017). 
 165  Id.  
 166  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985). 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. at 650. 
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on a good or service are more akin to a commercial speech regulation.169  In 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, the 
Supreme Court explained that commercial speech protections are principally 
justified by the value that information provides to the consumer, whereas 
advertisers have, at best, a minimal interest in withholding truthful 
information from the public.170 
Anti-surcharge laws are not mandatory disclosure requirements 
because they do not require that merchants provide information that they 
otherwise would not present to consumers.171  For example, merchant-
challengers in Expressions Hair Design sought to provide customers with 
information regarding swipe fees and the cost of using a credit card.172  They 
claimed that, as a result of this information, consumers will make a more 
conscious choice about their payment method because consumers will 
understand that their conduct may help reduce swipe fees and, in turn, reduce 
the price of goods.173  In a less altruistic sense, merchants may simply want 
to inform consumers that they, rather than the merchants, will incur the cost 
of doing business with credit cards.  In either situation, no-surcharge laws do 
not mandate that merchants provide information, but rather prevent them 
from presenting additional information about swipe fees to the public.  
Therefore, anti-surcharge restrictions are not mandatory disclosure 
requirements. 
While the laws do not constitute a disclosure requirement, they do 
dictate how a merchant must relate two pricing schemes that arrive at the 
same result and New York’s enforcement history of section 518 proves as 
much.174  In 2008 and 2009, the New York Attorney General “brought a 
series of sweeps” against approximately fifty merchants because those 
merchants charged customers a surcharge to pay with a credit card.175  For 
example, in 2009, the Attorney General’s office called Parkside Fuel, a small 
business, under the guise of an interested customer seeking information 
about Parkside Fuel’s pricing structure.176  When the Parkside Fuel employee 
stated that it charges an additional fee for credit payment, an Assistant 
Attorney General told Parkside Fuel’s owner that this practice constituted an 
illegal surcharge.177  The Assistant Attorney General subsequently provided 
the owner with “a script of what [he] could tell customers when talking to 
 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 651. 
 171  See id. at 650–51. 
 172  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 98, at 8–9. 
 173  Id.at 7–8. 
 174  Id. at 17. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. at 17–18. 
 177  Id. at 18 
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them over the phone” in order to comply with section 518, which provided 
that the owner would not violate the statute so long as he described any price 
alteration as a cash discount.178 
Similarly, the New York Attorney General’s office contacted K Skee 
Oil, another business imposing a credit surcharge, and informed K Skee Oil 
that its pricing scheme was illegal under section 518.179  An Assistant 
Attorney General informed K Skee Oil’s owner that he “can charge more for 
a credit card all [he] want[s], but [he has] to say that [it] is the cash discount 
rate.  [Your employee has] been saying that ‘it is a quarter more a gallon’ 
and they were not allowed to say that.”180  In sum, the New York Attorney 
General’s office contacted merchants who were perceived to have violated 
section 518 and informed them that if they did not properly describe their 
objective pricing practice in a particular manner, that they would be 
prosecuted.181 
Moreover, the surcharge/discount distinction regulates speech involved 
in a commercial transaction because the precise speech expressed can have 
determinative effects on a consumer’s behavior.  Surcharges and discounts 
have different psychological impacts on consumers and, in turn, behavioral 
economic theory plays a substantial role in the goal of the legislatures 
enacting anti-surcharge laws.  The theory of loss aversion dictates that 
individuals generally have a strong tendency to prefer avoiding loss to 
acquiring gain.182  For example, individuals often prefer receiving a $5 
discount on a product instead of incurring a $5 surcharge, regardless of the 
fact that the final price is identical.183  Consumers generally view surcharges 
as a loss and typically as “more unfair” than eliminating a discount, which is 
often viewed as the reduction of gain.184 
Originally, credit card companies banned affiliated stores from 
charging higher prices for credit purchases because they believed that credit 
surcharges would provide a disincentive to consumers from purchasing 
products with credit cards, thus affecting the overall profitability of the credit 
 
 178  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 98, at 18.  The AAG told the owner that he “‘could 
quote the price as $3.50/gallon, for example, and then explain to customers that they would 
receive a $.05/gallon “discount” for paying with cash,’ but he ‘could not quote the price as 
$3.45/gallon while explaining that they would have to pay a $.05/gallon “surcharge” to use a 
credit card.’”  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 98, at 18.   
 179  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 15, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 
F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-4533, 13-4537). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Mindy Hernandez, Behavioral Economics 101, PROSPERITY NOW (Apr. 2011), 
 https://prosperitynow.org/behavioral-economics-101. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Ricahrd H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Basis, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 203–05 (1991). 
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card industry.185  The agreements required that any difference between cash 
and credit prices be advertised as a cash discount due to the companies’ 
belief that consumers would view the cash discount as the opportunity cost 
of using a credit card, but view the surcharge as an out-of-pocket expense.186  
Behavioral economic theory provides that this distinction between a cash 
discount and a credit surcharge is merely one of framing: communication 
induced misconception.187 
Furthermore, behavioral economic theory illuminates the distinction 
between discounts and surcharges in ways that traditional economic theory 
cannot.188  Traditional economic theory dictates that the “market impact” of 
a surcharge on a credit transaction and a discount on a cash transaction 
should be identical, so long as the final price is the same; however, in 
practice, the two have different market impacts.189  Rational calculation is 
not always the driver of decision and individuals’ decisions are influenced 
by the manner in which information is presented to them.190  Though 
behavioral economic theory agrees with traditional economic theory that the 
final purchase price is the same—regardless of surcharge or discount 
framing—behavioral economists acknowledge that the framing of a price 
can produce vastly different results in the mind of the consumer.191  These 
differing impacts demonstrate that credit surcharges and cash discounts are 
two distinguishable communicative events and their regulation necessarily 
targets speech. 
Accordingly, in the single-sticker context, the anti-surcharge 
regulations serve as a prohibition on commercial speech because the 
merchants’ desired speech exists in an advertising format; it involves an 
underlying economic motive; it seeks to inform consumers of the merchants’ 
pricing strategy; and it mandates what merchants may say about his pricing 
strategy.  Moreover, the anti-surcharge statutes do not constitute mandatory 
disclosure requirements because they do not demand the disclosure of 
information that the merchants would otherwise not have provided, and 
instead serve as a prohibition on providing additional information. 
 
 185  Levitin, supra note 93, at 20.  This proposition supports the idea that anti-surcharge 
statutes, at the federal and state level, were the result of lobbying by the credit card industry.  
Id..  A disincentive for credit card use in its infancy may have altered the long-term 
profitability of the credit card industry. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 184, at 203–05. 
 188  Brief of Scholars of Behavioral Econ. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1391). 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 184, at 203–05. 
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B. Dual Pricing Schemes 
In the dual-pricing context, the commercial speech determination 
becomes less clear and turns almost entirely on the definition of the term 
“regular price.”192  So long as the term regular price is defined in agreement 
with the lapsed federal ban, then no-surcharge regulations do not regulate 
speech and only implicate conduct.193  Where regular price is undefined, 
however, surcharge laws implicate commercial speech and are subject to the 
Central Hudson test.194 
In Expressions Hair Design, the Second Circuit and Supreme Court 
declined to determine whether New York’s anti-surcharge statute reached 
dual-pricing schemes,195 though both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
concluded that dual-pricing is not prohibited under such laws.196  Since dual-
pricing is presumptively allowed, any speech challenge must be limited to 
whether the law burdens how a merchant may characterize the difference 
between prices.197 
1. Regular Price Defined 
So long as the term regular price is defined similarly to the definition 
in the lapsed federal ban, anti-surcharge laws do not implicate speech and 
regulate only conduct.198  The lapsed federal ban defined regular price as the 
credit price and prohibited a merchant from charging an additional amount 
above the credit price.199  With this definition, the law’s application is limited 
to fees charged in addition to the regular price and nothing more.200  
Accordingly, merchants are not prevented from posting a higher credit price 
and a lower cash price for the same product.201  Most significantly, the laws 
do not prohibit a storeowner from characterizing the difference between the 
two prices as a surcharge.202  That is, a seller may tell consumers that the 
difference between the two prices is a credit surcharge, but so long as he does 
 
 192  See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 139 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30, (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017); see 
Expressions II, 137 S. Ct. at 1151–52.  
 196  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 81 (5th Cir. 2016); Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney 
Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 197  See Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 132. 
 198  See discussion infra Part VI.B.1. 
 199  Cash Discount Act § 102, Pub.L. No. 97-25, 95 Stat. 144 (1981) (codified in relevant 
part at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(y)). 
 200  Id. 
 201  Id. 
 202  Id. 
ZELANTE(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  4:12 PM 
2018] COMMENT 955 
not charge an additional fee on top of the credit price, the merchant would 
not violate the law.203 
For example, assume that a merchant implements a dual-pricing 
scheme and lists the same product at $100 for cash purchasers and $102 for 
credit purchasers.  The regular price, the credit price, is $102.  The anti-
surcharge law’s application is limited to banning a storeowner from charging 
a fee in addition to the $102.  The storeowner, however, is not prohibited 
from characterizing the $2 difference as he sees fit because the law’s 
application is triggered only when the merchant charges a sum above the 
regular price.204  As a result, when the term regular price is defined as the 
credit price, anti-surcharge laws exclusively regulate the difference between 
a seller’s credit price and the fee imposed in addition to that credit price.  A 
seller may characterize or describe the relationship between the cash price 
and regular price as a surcharge, but that description would not change the 
fact that the merchant would not violate the terms of the statute.  
Accordingly, in this context, no-surcharge laws constitute a price regulation 
and do not implicate commercial speech. 
2. Regular Price Undefined 
When the term regular price is left undefined, anti-surcharge laws lose 
their conduct-related target and regulate speech by controlling how a 
merchant can characterize the difference between two prices.205  
Additionally, the definition-less standard further implicates speech because 
it requires a merchant to express which of the two prices in a dual-pricing 
scheme constitutes the regular price.206 
Dual pricing schemes are presumptively permitted by anti-surcharge 
statutes;207 however, where the statutes do not define regular price, the laws’ 
application turns entirely on merchant communication.208  That is, in the 
definition-less context, the difference between a product’s cash price and 
credit price cannot be described as a credit surcharge, but if a merchant 
carefully describes that same price difference as a cash discount, the 
merchant will evade violation of the statute.209  In the event that a merchant 
does not communicate this price difference with the specific association 
permitted by an anti-surcharge law, the merchant will be subjected to 
 
 203  Id.  
 204  Id. 
 205  See discussion infra Part VI.B.2. 
 206  Id. 
 207  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 81 (5th Cir. 2016); Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y 
Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 208  See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) 
 209  See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245.  
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prosecution.210  Accordingly, anti-surcharge regulations prohibit merchants 
from freely communicating an objective price difference in the manner of 
their choosing. 
Additionally, enforcing an anti-surcharge statute that does not define 
regular price necessarily requires speech from the merchant because, absent 
communication, a customer or prosecutor cannot designate the regular price.  
Without understanding which of the two prices in a dual-pricing scheme is 
the regular price, it becomes impossible to determine whether a merchant is 
implementing a credit surcharge.  Further, with the exception of the 
definition provided in the lapsed federal anti-surcharge regulation, which 
was not incorporated into the previously addressed state regulations, there 
exist no guidelines for determining a product’s regular price.211  For example, 
upon a trip to a gas station, a customer may observe a sign that relates gas 
prices—$2.00 cash and $2.10 credit—without any indication of which price 
is the regular price.  In this instance, the customer cannot be certain whether 
these prices represent a discount for cash payment or a surcharge for credit 
payment.  That is, without an interpretation from the seller, the customer is 
incapable of conclusively determining which price is the regular price solely 
based on a facial examination.  As a result, the regular price must be defined 
and expressed by the merchant.  Nevertheless, there exists no requirement 
that a merchant formally submit his pricing scheme for validation or 
approval with a state agency or a restriction on a merchant regularly altering 
his definition.212 
The distinction between statutes where regular price is defined and 
undefined is clarified with the same example used above.  Assume a 
merchant implements a dual-pricing scheme and charges $100 for cash and 
$102 for credit.  Where the term regular price is undefined, the merchant is 
prohibited from characterizing the difference as a surcharge; however, where 
the term regular price is defined the merchant is free to characterize the 
difference as he sees fit, so long as he does not charge an additional sum 
above the regular price.  Where the statute once governed conduct, it now 
governs speech. 
 
 210  See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (Consol. through 2017 released chapters 1-502). 
 211  See id. 
 212  For example, an employee at the gas station discussed above may serve two customers 
at the same time: Customer A and Customer B.  As each arrives, he or she asks an employee 
which of the two listed prices is the regular price and whether he or she is incurring a credit 
surcharge or a cash discount.  So long as the statute leaves regular price undefined, and the 
merchant is charged with communicating his regular price, the employee is seemingly not 
prohibited from informing Customer A that $2.00 is the regular price and informing Customer 
B that $2.10 is the regular price.  Thus, the enforceability of the statute would turn entirely on 
the communicative content of the employee, enabling a savvy store owner to inform 
customers that they are incurring a surcharge and inform law enforcement personnel that they 
are incurring a discount.  
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In sum, in the dual pricing context, determining whether an anti-
surcharge law amounts to a commercial speech restriction depends on a state 
legislature’s definition of the term regular price.  Where regular price is 
defined and limited to the definition adopted in the lapsed federal ban, the 
law governs economic conduct and does not implicate commercial speech 
protection.  Conversely, where regular price is undefined, the law governs 
commercial speech and requires analysis under the Central Hudson test. 
VII. ANTI-SURCHARGE STATUTES FAIL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON 
The last step in determining whether anti-surcharge laws 
unconstitutionally restrict commercial speech is applying the Central 
Hudson test.  This test asks whether: (1) the challenged regulation regulates 
speech that is misleading or related to unlawful activity; (2) the government 
has a substantial interest at stake in the challenged regulation; (3) the 
challenged regulation directly advances the government’s interest; and (4) a 
more limited restriction would be insufficient to achieve the government’s 
interest.213  These factors are applied to the laws in the single-sticker context 
and the dual-pricing context where regular price is undefined. 
A. Anti-Surcharge Laws Do Not Regulate Misleading Speech or 
Speech Related to an Unlawful Activity 
Laws prohibiting merchants from listing an additional price above the 
posted price in the single-sticker context, or explaining the price difference 
in the dual-pricing context, do not target misleading speech.214  They do, 
however, target unlawful activity, inasmuch as the laws cyclically make this 
speech unlawful. 
The Supreme Court has not defined “misleading speech,” but the term 
is often used in conjunction with false speech.215  Under either pricing 
schemes—single-sticker or dual pricing— a surcharge does not provide false 
information.  Additionally, in the dual-pricing context, both prices are listed 
in the same location,216 which is presumptively where the buyer physically 
obtains the good or service.  The speech involved in dual-pricing merely 
characterizes the difference between the two prices and the customer does 
 
 213  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 214  See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
 215  See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564 (2011); Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 
U.S. 654, 666 (2003).  See also Misleading, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 2015) 
(defining “misleading” as “delusive; calculated to lead astray or to lead into error”).  
 216  Expressions III, 877 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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not encounter a price change upon arrival at the register.217  As it pertains to 
dual-pricing, the surcharge characterization is not misleading, as the 
consumer is presented with the full universe of factual information 
pertaining to his transaction prior to payment.218  Upon reaching the register, 
a consumer may encounter a sign or conversation explaining that the 
difference is a surcharge or a discount, but the consumer is not presented 
with new information, and therefore, the characterization is not 
misleading.219 
In the single-sticker context, the potential for misleading speech is 
substantially higher.  There, a consumer can learn of a fee in addition to the 
listed price for the first time at the register.  The potential is increased further 
when a merchant advertises the surcharge as a percentage of the purchase 
price rather than a definitive dollar amount.  Inasmuch as the consumer is 
unaware of the ensuing surcharge, potentially a 2%–5% increase in regard to 
the total cost,220 it would present new information regarding the final cost.  
New information, however, cannot be dispositive of misleading speech.  
Breaking down the total cost of a product (surcharge included), the listed 
price typically reflects the market price of that product,221 and the listed 
surcharge typically reflects the market price of using a credit card.222  The 
proposition of paying an additional market rate fee on top of the listed price 
for a good or service is not a foreign concept to American consumers.223  In 
the restaurant industry, for example, patrons are expected to tip an 
undetermined amount on top of the listed price of food.224  The normalization 
and expectation of this additional fee has become so engrained in American 
culture that employers account for tips in servers’ income and adjust their 
wages accordingly.225  Additionally, American consumers are typically 
presented with an extra percentage based price at the register in the form of 
 
 217  See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Merchant, supra note 2, at 356. 
 221  Wayne C. Lusvardi & Charles B. Warren, Unplanned Telecom Corridor Markets: The 
Marketization of Fiber Optic Easements by Deregulated Network Industries, 5 PLANNING & 
MARKETS 1, 9 (2000), http://www-pam.usc.edu/volume5/v5i1a1s1.html#contents. 
 222  With the exception of Minnesota, no state’s anti-surcharge law restricts the maximum 
surcharge that a seller can implement.  Credit or Debit Card Surcharge State Statutes, supra 
note 2.  The conclusion a surcharge would reflect the market price of using a credit card is 
reliant on the assumption that merchants would not seek to un-competitively price their goods 
or services.  To the extent that a merchant’s actions do not align with that assumption, the 
surcharge may not reflect the market price of using a credit card.  
 223  See Lie Wang, An Investigation and Analysis of U.S. Restaurant Tipping Practices 
and the Relationship to Service Quality with Recommendations for Field Application (2010) 
(published M.A. dissertation, University of Nevada, Las Vegas). 
 224  Id. 
 225  Id. 
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sales tax.226  In fact, unless an individual lives in one of five states without 
state sales tax, a “pay-what-you-see” price is the exception rather than the 
rule.227  Moreover, consumers often operate without knowledge of or 
concern for sales tax;228 however, the government has not mandated that the 
two prices be combined into one advertised price.  Instead, the states’ sales 
tax framework allows consumers to know precisely the cost of the product 
and precisely the cost of the tax.  In comparison, the single-sticker surcharge 
is no more misleading than a service tip or a sales tax, and poses a smaller 
addition to the final price. 
Further, states cannot place an “absolute prohibition on certain types of 
potentially misleading information . . . if the information also may be 
presented in a way that is not deceptive.”229  That is, restrictions on 
potentially misleading speech cannot be broader than necessary to prevent 
potential deception.230  To the extent that single-sticker surcharges present a 
surprise at the register, the restriction is impermissibly absolute.  Though a 
surprise at the register may be misleading, advertising the surcharge at the 
door, or throughout the store alongside the listed prices, would certainly 
alleviate any unintended deception.  In either example, the speech would be 
both informative and accurate.   
Accordingly, in the dual pricing context, the anti-surcharge laws are not 
misleading and, to the limited extent that such laws may be misleading in the 
single-sticker context, the laws regulate more conduct than is necessary, as 
they go beyond what is required to prevent potential deception.  As a result, 
the laws fail the first step of Central Hudson. 
B. No Sufficiently Substantial State Interest Exists and Is Regulated 
by Anti-Surcharge Statutes 
Second, to satisfy the Central Hudson test, the anti-surcharge statutes 
must regulate a substantial state interest.231  In the four cases discussed 
above, the states asserted several state interests.  Some states argued that 
credit surcharges will have a dampening effect on the economy because they 
will provide a disincentive for credit use.232  Others suggested that surcharge 
 
 226  Scott Drenkard & Jard Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX FOUND. 
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2015/. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Jacob Goldsin, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive 
Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258, 264–66 (2012) (discussing the differing effects of tax saliency 
on consumers’ purchasing habits).  
 229  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
 230  Id. 
 231  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
 232  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
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prices will be unjustifiably larger than the average swipe fee and, in practice, 
result in windfall profits to merchants.233  The history of section 518 of the 
New York General Business Law provides that the bill was enacted to 
prevent against the risk of a sudden fluctuation in prices that merchants may 
charge when learning that a customer plans to pay with a credit card.234  The 
legislature determined that if it were to leave this possibility unregulated, 
then consumers would be “subject to dubious marketing practices and 
variable purchase prices.”235  The sponsor of section 339.001 of the Texas 
Finance Code stated that it was in the State’s best interest “to protect the 
consumer” until the federal government manages to federally ban credit card 
surcharges.236  Similarly, the California legislature stated that its law was 
created to “promote the effective operation of the free market[,] protect 
consumers from deceptive price increases[, and to] encourage the 
availability of discounts.”237  Section 501.0117 of the Florida. Statute 
Annotated  was also established in response to consumer protection 
interests.238 
Viewed together, these assertions suggest that these states enacted anti-
surcharge laws to ensure that merchants would not exploit, defraud, or 
mislead consumers.  Preventing fraud certainly qualifies as a substantial state 
interest; however, in practice, fraud and exploitation are not the targets.  The 
states’ restrictions are prohibitions on the dissemination of truthful 
information as a means to thwart sellers’ abilities to label a price difference 
or advertise the market cost of using a credit card.  Importantly, states do not 
have an interest in prohibiting truthful communication to keep the public 
from making what the states perceive as an undesirable judgment based on 
the information presented.239  Additionally, any preventative interest 
regarding misleading pricing schemes, to the extent that any are misleading, 
must be limited to the single-sticker “surprise at the register” scheme. 
To satisfy the burden of showing that anti-surcharge laws address an 
interest in preventing sellers from misleading, defrauding, or exploiting 
consumers, states must provide more than conclusory statements.240  The 
states must establish something above “mere speculation or conjecture” to 
prove that the evils or undesirable practices they regulate are real and that 
 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 233  Id. 
 234  Id. at 123. 
 235  Id. 
 236  Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 237  Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 238  Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 239  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 
(1976). 
 240  Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). 
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the regulation will actually assuage those harms to a “material degree.”241  
Here, the states cannot meet this burden.  Any asserted interest—preventing 
fraud, exploitation, or misleading prices—is undermined by the statutes’ 
enforcement.  Each anti-surcharge statute discussed above provides an 
exception such that the laws do not apply to the states that enforce them.242  
Specifically, the anti-surcharge statutes do not restrict the states themselves 
from implementing surcharges on credit payments for government services, 
such as public school tuition.243  The states failed to provide any rationale 
from which one could conclude that consumers are less susceptible to these 
harms because the state, rather than a merchant, is implementing the 
surcharge.244  Since these anti-surcharge statutes permit the government to 
engage in this allegedly harmful and misleading practice, the conclusion that 
the practice is not dangerous is unavoidable.245 
Additionally, an asserted interest in preventing a general harm is 
insufficient to satisfy the Central Hudson test246 because regulations that 
suppress or eradicate truthful commercial speech infrequently protect the 
public.247  It is not sufficient that states assume a regulation serves a 
substantial interest because it prevents consumers from responding 
 
 241  Id. 
 242  Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1250 (“Florida has exempted certain state agencies 
from its no-surcharge law—allowing them to charge ‘convenience fees’ for the privilege of 
using a credit card . . .—without advancing any relevant distinction between private 
merchants and state agencies that references the asserted interests being served.  If customers 
would be harmed by learning that they faced surcharges but not discounts from private 
merchants, creating an exception allowing the State to impose convenience fees betrays the 
frailty of any potential state interest.” (emphasis in original)).  See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017) (providing that the Texas anti-surcharge statute does 
not apply to state agencies, local governments, county governments, or private or public 
schools); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(f) (LEXISNEXIS 2018) (providing that California 
anti-surcharge statues do not apply to payments made by credit card by an “electrical, gas, or 
water corporation and approved by the Public Utilities Commission”). 
 243  Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1250; TEX. FIN. CODE § 339.001 (LEXISNEXIS 2017); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(f). 
 244  See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1250; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(f) (LEXISNEXIS 
2018); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017). 
 245  City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) (“Exemptions from an otherwise 
legitimate regulation of a medium of speech may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart from 
the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: they may diminish the credibility of the 
government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.”).  
 246  See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993) (holding 
that it is the state’s interest in protecting consumers from “commercial harms” that provides 
the “the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental 
regulation than noncommercial speech.”). 
 247  Id. at 427–28.  See also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 
85, 96 (1977) (holding that the reason that bans against truthful commercial speech rarely 
seek to protect consumers from either deception or overreaching, is because they usually rest 
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond “irrationally” to the truth).  
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undesirably to the truth.248  Moreover, the remedy necessary for misleading 
speech is “more speech, not enforced silence.”249 
Aside from dual-pricing regulations that have adopted the federal 
definition of regular price, anti-surcharge statutes do not regulate conduct; 
they regulate the manner in which a merchant communicates prices.  A 
blanket restriction on this communication does not target fraud and it does 
not target exploitation.  Additionally, these restrictions do not target 
misleading speech because the government engages in analogous speech.  
More likely, no-surcharge statutes are the result of both lobbying from the 
credit card industry and a desire to promote consumer spending rather than 
protecting a substantial interest.250  Accordingly, anti-surcharge regulations 
do not serve a substantial state interest in protecting consumers. 
C.  State Anti-Surcharge Regulations Fail to Directly Advance the 
Asserted State Interests and a More Limited Restriction Would 
Adequately Prevent Harm 
The final two prongs of the Central Hudson test are analyzed in 
conjunction.  In order for the state anti-surcharge regulations to further 
satisfy heightened scrutiny, they must directly advance the states’ asserted 
interests and a more limited restriction must be insufficient to achieve those 
interests.251  A blanket ban on communicating a price increase or 
characterizing a price difference does not advance the states’ asserted 
interests and a narrower regulation would not inhibit the government’s 
ability to prevent misleading information. 
Assuming arguendo that anti-surcharge laws serve a substantial state 
interest in preventing merchants’ abilities to obtain windfall profits and 
limiting consumer confusion, these interests are not directly advanced.  In 
the dual-pricing context, the laws’ restrictions on the characterization of a 
difference between two prices do not prevent consumer confusion.  There, 
consumers are not presented with new information or a price increase at the 
register.  Additionally, the difference between the two prices likely reflects 
the amount of the would-be surcharge.  Since the merchant has already 
elected to offer different prices for cash and credit, it is improbable that a 
merchant would charge an additional fee on top of the already increased 
credit price.  Further, anti-surcharge laws do not limit the scope of an 
available price difference between cash and credit prices, and therefore, do 
 
 248  Id. 
 249  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
 250  Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 30, (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 251  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
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not advance the goal of preventing windfall profits via surcharge. 
In the single-sticker context, the laws advance the interest of preventing 
customer confusion and partially advance the goal of preventing windfall 
profits through surcharges.  The laws ensure that a customer will not arrive 
at the register and learn that the final price has increased because of his or 
her selected payment method.  In this regard, consumer confusion is 
prevented.  Further, no-surcharge laws facially provide that merchants 
cannot implement any surcharge and, therefore, cannot implement an 
arbitrary surcharge that is disproportionately larger than the swipe fee and 
reap the rewards.252  These laws, however, allow merchants to provide cash 
discounts and do not regulate how a seller must set the regular price 
(assuming it is the credit price) in relation to the advertised discount.253  In 
practice, this allows merchants to manipulate their pricing scheme and 
effectively turn a cash discount into a credit surcharge.  For example, assume 
the fair market value of a product is $100 and the applicable swipe fee is 1% 
of the purchase price.  A merchant then lists that product at $102 and offers 
a 2.04% cash discount. There, the swipe fee is $1.02, the cash customer pays 
$100 and, the credit customer pays $102.  In this example, the swipe fee is 
offset by the price increase and the merchant obtains $0.98 extra on all credit 
customers.  The seller is still capable of profiting from mere credit use so 
long as he lists the regular price slightly above market value.  As a result, the 
anti-surcharge laws advance the goal of preventing windfall profits, but can 
be circumvented with minor alterations to market rate pricing. 
Additionally, a more narrow restriction is not insufficient to achieve the 
states’ goals.  Prohibiting windfall profits via credit surcharges is preventable 
by establishing a maximum surcharge limit.  Minnesota’s anti-surcharge 
restriction, where credit surcharges are allowed, but cannot exceed 5%, 
serves as a blueprint.254  Similarly, a state legislature may expressly tie 
surcharges to swipe fees, such that they may differ by credit card and never 
exceed the swipe fee.  Moreover, consumer deception can be directly 
addressed with mandatory disclosure requirements.  Minnesota’s law is 
again instructive.255  There, the seller must orally inform the buyer at the time 
of the sale and “by [a] sign conspicuously posted on the seller’s premises” 
of any applicable credit surcharge.256  There is no need to limit the 
requirement to one sign or to provide the seller with the discretion to choose 
the sign’s location.  After all, if the sign was located at the register it would 
 
 252  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(f) (LEXISNEXIS 2018); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 604A.0021 (LEXISNEXIS 2017).  
 253  Id. 
 254  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.051 (LEXISNEXIS 2017). 
 255  Id. 
 256  Id. 
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not provide much, if any, additional notice.  States may require sellers to 
provide a sign detailing the specific surcharge scheme and to place that sign 
outside and throughout the store.  Lastly, states could, and likely already do, 
ban specific false and deceptive trade practices, such as bait-and-switch 
tactics.  These examples are not an exhaustive list of possible alternatives, 
but sufficiently illustrate that the anti-surcharge laws’ asserted interests are 
achievable through more limited restrictions.  As a result, the anti-surcharge 
laws fail the final two prongs in the Central Hudson test, in addition to the 
first two prongs, and therefore fail intermediate scrutiny. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, state anti-surcharge regulations qualify as commercial speech 
in most pricing schemes.  In the single-sticker context, the laws mandate how 
a merchant may communicate a pricing format to customers.  In a dual-
pricing scheme, so long as regular price is undefined, sellers are prohibited 
from characterizing an objective price difference with certain terminology.  
Where the regular price is defined in accord with the expired federal ban’s 
definition, anti-surcharge laws operate irrespective of speech and exclusively 
regulate conduct.  Additionally, as applied to the aforementioned speech 
regulated pricing schemes, the laws fail intermediate scrutiny at each stage 
of the Central Hudson test.  Consequently, state anti-surcharge regulations 
constitute an unconstitutional abridgement of sellers’ commercial speech 
rights and Expressions Hair Design provides merchants with the vehicle to 
properly reclaim these rights. 
 
